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INTRODUCTION 
n the fall of 2013, Representative Tim Murphy of Pennsylvania 
introduced comprehensive legislation to reform the federal framework 
that shapes the delivery of mental health care throughout the United 
States.1 Murphy, a clinical psychologist, had been charged by the 
Republican leadership in the House of Representatives with developing a 
legislative response to the highly publicized mass school shooting that had 
taken place in Newtown, Connecticut.2 The Murphy Bill was fashioned to 
reform a number of existing policies and practices, including the Medicaid 
reimbursement rules for inpatient psychiatric care, the funding 
requirements for community-based behavioral health services, and the 
health privacy rules that restrict the communication of patient information 
to family members and other caregivers of adult psychiatric patients.3 In 
addition, the bill proposed a system for linking primary care physicians 
with mental health professionals in order to provide behavioral health 
services to rural and other difficult to reach patients.4 Among the various 
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  For help in 
planning and developing this article, I thank Eileen Canfield, Samantha Collado, Alan 
Dunklow, Susan McCarty, Amanda Pustilnik, and Sabrina Zaidi. This project was supported 
by a research grant from the University of Maryland Carey School of Law. 
1 See Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act of 2013, H.R. 3717, 113th Cong. (2013). 
2 See Benedict Carey, Mental Health Groups Split on Bill to Overhaul Care, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/health/mental-health-groups-split-on-bill- 
to-revamp-care.html [hereinafter Carey, Mental Health Groups Split]. 
3 H.R. 3717, supra note 1, §§ 201–301; see also 160 CONG. REC. 4, 26 (2014) [hereinafter 160 
CONG. REC.]. 
4  H.R. 3717, supra note 1, § 201(c)(2); Carey, Mental Health Groups Split, supra note 2; see 160 
CONG. REC., supra note 3, at 26–27. 
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proposals, perhaps the most controversial was a provision designed to 
encourage the states to make greater use of outpatient civil commitment.5 
The Murphy Bill was a complex amalgam of proposed policies 
intended, on the one hand, to serve the government’s parens patriae interest 
in promoting the well-being of individuals with mental illness and, on the 
other,  with advancing its police power interest in public safety. The title of 
the bill, “The Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act,” and the 
rhetoric surrounding its introduction, suggest that the various reforms 
proposed in the bill were designed primarily to assist the families of 
severely mentally ill patients to access needed services, facilitate the 
involvement of those families in the treatment of their loved ones, and 
encourage the retention of treatment-resistant chronic mentally ill patients 
in clinical settings in the community to ensure their  compliance with 
medication regimens in order to avoid the more severe consequences of 
decompensation and hospitalization that often result from inadequate 
treatment.6 At the same time, the origins of the bill in the Newtown 
shootings and its emphasis on enforced treatment signal a primary concern 
with the police power goal of preventing the violent anti-social behavior 
that may result from severe mental illness.7 
Representative Murphy’s bill summary reflects this dual focus. While 
acknowledging that “[t]he mentally ill are no more violent than anyone 
else, and in fact are more likely to be the victims of violence than the 
perpetrators,” Murphy also asserted that “individuals with untreated 
serious mental illness are at an increased risk of violent behavior,” and 
presumably would pose less of a risk to the community if the enforced 
treatment provisions of the bill were enacted.8 
Given the Murphy Bill’s express critique of much within the existing 
public mental health system and its announced intention to reform that 
system, the inclusion of both parens patriae and police powers objectives in 
the bill is significant. In some respects, this approach appears to draw from 
a familiar critical narrative of mental health policy in the United States that 
has been pressed by a number of commentators for some time. This 
narrative asserts that the failure of mental health law and policy has been 
5 See Carey, Mental Health Groups Split, supra note 2. Outpatient commitment “is a civil 
court procedure whereby a judge can order a noncompliant mentally ill patient to adhere to 
needed treatment.” Marvin S. Swartz & Jeffrey W. Swanson, Outpatient Commitment: When it 
Improves Patient Outcomes, WESTLAW PSYCHIATRY, Apr. 2008, at 25. 
6 See generally TIM MURPHY, THE HELPING FAMILIES IN MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS ACT, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 3717, available at http://murphy.house.gov/uploads/Four-page%20Summary%20 
Helping%20Families%20in%20MH%20Crisis%20Act.Apr.2014.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
7 See Carey, Mental Health Groups Split, supra note 2. 
8 MURPHY, supra note 6, at 1. 
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due in large part to the decision of reformers, courts, and legislatures in the 
1970s and 1980s to reject the parens patriae foundations of longstanding 
mental health practice and policy, and to focus instead on the state’s police 
power interest in preventing dangerous conduct.9 Representative Murphy 
and his allies seek to retain—indeed strengthen—the states’ policy focus on 
preventing dangerous conduct on the part of the severely mentally ill, 
while simultaneously reinvigorating a more paternalistic—indeed 
coercively paternalistic—government practice rooted in the states’ parens 
patriae interests in the health and well-being of persons with mental illness 
and their families. 
In the House of Representatives, the Murphy Bill was met by an 
alternative set of proposals that were developed by Arizona Representative 
Ron Barber and supported by the Democratic leadership in Congress.10 The 
Barber alternative sought to increase funding for community-based 
treatment, but did not include provisions to encourage the use of 
outpatient commitment or other forms of enforced community-based 
care.11 Critics of the Murphy Bill, including a number of prominent 
professional groups and other civil rights organizations concerned with the 
rights of mentally disabled persons, argued that an increased focus on 
enforced treatment would likely drive individuals with mental illness 
away from treatment.12 The critics’ preference for voluntary treatment and 
increased community-located resources, including intensive case 
management services, assisted housing, and other wraparound resources, 
was reflected in the Barber alternative.13 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the law governing 
involuntary civil commitment in the United States, with a particular focus 
on the reforms of the 1970s that moved the system away from its parens 
patriae foundations and toward a much greater reliance on a police power 
rationale for involuntary confinement. It also explores the perspective that 
informed these libertarian reforms and a competing perspective that has 
emerged in the recent discussions over outpatient commitment. Part II 
reviews the variety of approaches adopted by states for authorizing 
outpatient commitment, either as a front-end intervention or as a step 
9 See, e.g., Rael Jean Isaac & Samuel Jan Brakel, Subverting Good Intentions: A Brief History of 
Mental Health Law “Reform,” 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 99, 103, 108 (1992). 
10 See Strengthening Mental Health in Our Communities Act of 2014, H.R. 4574, 113th 
Cong. (introduced May 6, 2014). 
11 See id. 
12 See Carey, Mental Health Group Split, supra note 2. 
13 Taylor Sisk, Mental Health Care Reconstruction: Two Visions, N.C. HEALTH NEWS (July 8, 
2014), http://www.northcarolinahealthnews.org/2014/07/08/mental-health-care- 
reconstruction-two-visions/. 
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down following inpatient hospitalization. Part III, in turn, takes up several 
issues with respect to funding, implementation, and enforcement that are 
raised by the calls for increased use of mandated community-based 
treatment. Part IV reviews the available data on outcomes, particularly 
with respect to subsequent hospitalizations and criminal system 
involvement. The Article concludes with a summary assessment of the 
considerations pushing for and against the greater adoption of outpatient 
commitment. 
I. History: Perspectives and Context 
The first civil commitment statutes were enacted in the United States in 
the late eighteenth century.14 By the time of the Civil War, the practice of 
civilly committing severely mentally ill persons was not uncommon, 
although the legal standards governing these decisions were at best 
rudimentary.15 Beginning in the Progressive Era, reformers influenced by 
Benjamin Rush and Dorothea Dix advocated for more treatment resources 
for the mentally ill and for an increased “medicalization” of civil 
commitment.16 These efforts gained momentum after World War II, as 
more state hospitals were constructed and new treatment technologies 
became available.17 In many American jurisdictions between the 1940s and 
the early 1970s, the decision whether to approve the involuntary 
hospitalization of a mentally ill person was made by a physicians board or 
“lunacy commission” on the basis of highly subjective criteria, and in a 
majority of states the decision to hospitalize was based simply on the 
certification of one or more physicians that an individual was mentally ill 
and in need of treatment.18 By the mid-1950s, more than a half million 
individuals were hospitalized in state mental institutions, many essentially 
for life.19 
Beginning in the late 1960s, the pendulum swung in a more libertarian 
direction. The roots of this shift can be found even earlier, in a series of 
14 See SAMUEL BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 14 (3d ed. 1985). 
15 See Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The American Experience, 
43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY RELAT. SCI. 209, 210 (2006), available at http://doctorsonly.co.il/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/2006_3_14.pdf.  
16 DONALD H. BLOCHER, THE EVOLUTION OF COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGY 130–31 (Bill Tucker 
& J Hurkin-Torres eds., 2000). In this context, “medicalization” means that the criteria for 
determining whether to commit a patient are focused on his or her need for and amenability 
to treatment rather than on decisional competency or dangerousness, and that the process for 
decision relies upon  medical personnel rather than judicial officers. See id. 
17 See id. at 130–36.   
18 See generally THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 40 (3d ed. 2000). 
19 See Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 97. 
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exposés written by concerned journalists and academics about troubling 
conditions found in a number of state hospitals,20 and in a set of highly 
consequential hearings on abuses in public mental hospitals held in the 
U.S. Senate by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.21 Between 1970 
and the early 1980s, a wave of statutory reform swept the country, 
replacing permissive “need for treatment” admissions criteria with new, 
more libertarian rules requiring a showing that an individual subject to 
civil commitment posed a danger to him or herself or others.22 A 
judicialization of the decision-making process also took place during this 
period, making judges or other judicial officers the primary decision-
makers for purposes of involuntary commitment.23 There was some case 
law supporting these developments, most prominently the federal district 
court decision in Lessard v. Schmidt in 1972, suggesting that a judicial 
finding of both mental illness and dangerousness was a constitutional 
requirement for commitment,24 and the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Addington v. Texas, requiring that the criteria for involuntary 
commitment be established by a standard of clear and convincing 
evidence.25 
Rael Jean Isaac and Samuel Jan Brakel have argued that these 
reforms—which began  with a model civil commitment bill for the District 
of Columbia in the U.S. Senate, adopted in somewhat modified form by the 
District of Columbia in 1964,26 and which ignited a process of statutory 
revision and deinstitutionalization across the country—were founded on 
two essential premises. The first was that psychiatric patients, including 
those with severe mental illnesses, ought to be presumed competent to 
make treatment decisions—including the decision to refuse treatment—
absent a judicial finding of incompetency separate from the involuntary 
20 See ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948); Albert Maisel, Bedlam, LIFE, May 
6, 1946, at 102. 
21 See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 
36, 47 (1961); Hearings to Protect the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, Hearings on S. 935 
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 61 
(1963). 
22 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 703–04 (5th ed. 
2009). Among the most influential state statutory reforms of this period was the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act, passed by the California legislature in 1967. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 
et seq. (West 2010 & Supp. 2014).   
23  See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 704. 
24  349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
25  441 U.S. 418, 443 (1979). 
26  See Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 98. 
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civil commitment decision.27 The second premise was that imminent 
dangerousness, either to one’s self or to others, is an appropriate and 
necessary predicate for the exercise of the state’s coercive power over the 
mentally ill, particularly with respect to the decision to involuntarily 
commit an individual to care in a psychiatric hospital.28 
Before the late 1960s, the legal status of incompetency for adults was 
most often established by a presumption triggered by the involuntary civil 
commitment of someone with a mental disability.29 In most jurisdictions 
this presumption of incompetency was irrebuttable, and a determination 
that an individual was subject to civil commitment was the “equivalent of a 
finding of general incompetency.”30 In response to this longstanding 
practice, many advocates for reform asserted that mental illnesses and 
other mental disabilities severe enough to warrant inpatient treatment do 
not necessarily render patients unable to make significant decisions, 
including the decision either to consent to or refuse psychiatric treatment. 
Their argument, which prevailed in a number of legislative revisions, was 
that the rules governing the rights of other patients to give (or withhold) 
informed consent to treatment ought to apply to psychiatric patients as 
well, unless a specific finding of incompetency was made.31 Thus, in the 
jurisdictions that adopted this reform, the irrebuttable presumption that a 
person subject to involuntary commitment is generally incompetent was 
replaced by the ordinary presumption that all adults are competent until 
found otherwise by a court of appropriate jurisdiction.32 
The reformers’ second premise, that involuntary commitment should 
be based on dangerousness rather than, or in addition to, one’s need for or 
amenability to treatment,33 was rooted in a desire to protect the individual 
27 Id. at 100. 
28 Id. at 99. 
29 See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 18, at 222. 
30 Id. 
31 See Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 109. 
32 See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 18, at 223. 
33 In a series of cases involving so-called “sexual predators,” the United States Supreme 
Court has exhibited some ambivalence on the question of whether a state may constitutionally 
use its civil commitment authority to restrain a dangerous individual, even if no effective 
treatment for the underlying disability is available. Compare Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 
84–86 (1992) (holding that criminal offender with a personality disorder who completed 
criminal sentence could not be held on grounds of dangerousness), with Kansas v. Hendricks, 
521 U.S. 346, 351, 356–57 (1997) (holding that the U.S. Constitution does not prevent states 
from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 
U.S. 407, 411–14 (2002)(holding that the U.S. Constitution does not allow civil commitment 
without a determination of whether the sexual offender lacked control over his dangerous 
behavior). 
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autonomy and self-determination of persons with mental disabilities.34 On 
these terms, reformers criticized the “need for treatment” standard for civil 
commitment that had prevailed for decades as overly paternalistic and 
insufficiently attentive to the obligation of a democratic society to limit 
coercive government intervention to circumstances in which it is necessary 
to ensure the safety of individuals in the community.35 
The shift to a dangerousness standard for involuntary confinement 
combined with the first premise, that individuals subject to civil 
commitment should be presumed competent, to support arguments that 
psychiatric patients should retain the right to refuse psychotropic 
medications and other forms of treatment unless specific judicial findings 
of incompetence and medical necessity were also obtained.36 Taken 
together, these two premises fundamentally shifted the foundations on 
which coercive care of the mentally ill and the mentally disabled rested. At 
its highpoint in the mid-twentieth century, the use of involuntary civil 
commitment was best understood as an exercise of the state’s parens patriae 
power to provide for the care and well-being of vulnerable persons. As 
these reforms developed and the deinstitutionalization of this population 
proceeded during the last quarter of the twentieth century, that 
foundational justification gave way and the state’s police power concern 
for protecting against the dangers associated with severe mental illness 
largely took its place.37 The changing rationale for the confinement of 
mentally ill persons and the emerging jurisprudence recognizing their right 
to refuse treatment were mutually reinforcing developments: 
As long as patients were hospitalized on the ground that they 
needed treatment, it seemed a contradiction in terms to advance a 
“right to refuse treatment.” . . . But once the parens patriae basis 
for treating the patient was abandoned, and the state committed 
the individual only because he was dangerous, commitment and 
treatment were divorced.38 
Not only did dangerousness replace a need for treatment as the 
primary consideration for triggering involuntary commitment, many 
jurisdictions also implemented judicial or statutory requirements that the 
34 See Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of 
the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 55 (1982). See generally Symposium, Mental Illness, 
the Law, and Civil Liberties, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 367 (1973). 
35 See Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 
1201 (1974). 
36 See, e.g., Rogers v. Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Mass. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 
337, 341 (N.Y. 1986).  
37 See Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 108. 
38 Id. at 107–08. 
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imminence of that danger be established by evidence of a recent overt act.39 
Moreover, in some states where civil commitment had been permitted on a 
showing that mental illness or other mental disability rendered an 
individual incapable of providing for basic necessities, such as food or 
housing, a criterion that was a “remnant of the parens patriae power,”40 the 
police power notion of danger to self was broadened to include individuals 
whose illness rendered them “grave[ly] disabled” or significantly impaired 
with respect to their ability to provide for basic necessities.41 
Both of the premises on which these reforms rested, as well as the more 
general move away from a reliance on the parens patriae authority of the 
state as the basis for coercive intervention, were and remain subject to 
intense debate and disagreement among clinicians, patients’ advocates, 
and others. With respect to the presumption that most psychiatric patients 
retain the capacity to make an informed choice about whether to receive 
psychotropic medications or other proposed therapies, Isaac and Brakel 
argue that severely mentally ill persons “are not the equivalent of heart or 
cancer patients.” They assert that these individuals’ “presumed 
competency is a fiction,” and that the very nature of psychosis is that it 
disrupts thought processes and impairs the individual’s capacity for 
rational decision-making.42 
Proponents of the Murphy Bill’s strong emphasis on outpatient 
commitment and enforced treatment, as well as other advocates who 
support assisted outpatient treatment legislation and criticize what they 
regard as overly libertarian civil commitment standards, seek to reinforce 
Isaac and Brakel’s distinction between psychiatric patients and 
surgical/medical patients  by emphasizing the prevalence among persons 
with schizophrenia and severe bipolar disorder of the phenomenon of 
“anosognosia,” which is a lack of insight about one’s disease and an 
inability to recognize the need for treatment.43 This lack of understanding, 
39 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f)(3)(A) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1, 
2014); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) 
(finding of dangerousness sufficient to support police power commitment must be based on 
“a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm”). 
40 See Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 103. 
41 See id. As civil commitment has become increasingly centered on the state’s police power 
interest in restraining and treating patients whose mental disability poses a danger to 
themselves or to others, the state’s parens patriae interest in caring for those who are incapable 
of caring for themselves has increasingly become concentrated in the judicial process by 
which incompetency (and guardianship) are determined. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 
26-27; GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 18, at 223; see also BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 
370. 
42 Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 100. 
43 The Treatment Advocacy Center, an organization that has made outpatient commitment 
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which some argue is not only concurrent with the delusions, 
hallucinations, or other thought disorders associated with severe mental 
illness, but is also a product of structural changes in the brain brought 
about by the underlying pathology,44 is said to provide a factual and ethical 
basis for a more aggressive form of paternalism than is currently reflected 
in the laws of many states.45 Indeed, some even argue that because of the 
phenomenon of anosognosia, the practice of subjecting severely mentally 
ill individuals to judicially ordered outpatient treatment does not 
constitute “involuntary” outpatient commitment at all, but rather 
“assisted” outpatient treatment. This is the case, they explain, because the 
imposed treatment is likely what the patient would have chosen had he or 
she not been afflicted by this neurological disorder that impairs one’s 
ability to recognize the need for treatment.46 
On the other side of this debate are a group of clinicians and patients’ 
advocates who argue that behavioral health treatment ought to be 
voluntary and subject to the consent of the patient.47 In their view, the 
state’s limited authority under its police powers should be the sole basis for 
coercive interventions, which should be restricted to situations where an 
individual’s mental illness or other mental disability poses an immediate 
and palpable danger to that individual or the public. Inherent in this 
position, of course, is a deep commitment to the premise that voluntary 
consent is a coherent requirement with respect even to persons with severe 
a centerpiece of their law reform advocacy, defines the condition as follows: 
Anosognosia—“lack of insight” or “lack of awareness”—is believed to be 
the single largest reason why individuals with schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder do not take their medications. A result of anatomical damage to 
the brain, it affects approximately 50% of individuals with schizophrenia 
and 40% of individuals with bipolar disorder. When taking medications, 
awareness of illness improves in some patients.  
Anosognosia, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/ 
problem/anosognosia (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
44 See The Anatomical Basis of Anosognosia - Backgrounder, TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER 
(updated May 2013), http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/about-us/our-reports-and-
studies/2143. 
45 See Guido R. Zanni & Paul F. Stavis, The Effectiveness and Ethical Justification of Psychiatric 
Outpatient Commitment, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 31, 33 (2007); Xavier F. Amador & Andrew A. 
Shiva, Insight into Schizophrenia: Anosognosia, Competency, and Civil Liberties, 11 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 25, 35, 37 (2000). 
46 See John Monahan et al., Reply to Erik Roskes, Letter to the Editor, “Assisted Outpatient 
Treatment”: An Example of Newspeak?, 64 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1179, 1179 (2013). 
47 See Donald H. Stone, The Benefits of Voluntary Inpatient Psychiatric Hospitalization: Myth or 
Reality?, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 26–28 (1999).   
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mental illness. As the David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law puts 
it: 
Forced mental health care is never appropriate, except when 
there are immediate and serious safety risks. And even then, 
listening to consumers and respecting their choices is essential to 
designing service plans that succeed. For choice to be real, 
systems must offer a wide array of interventions and supports, 
and consumers must understand their benefits and risks. . . . 
Coercive systems with a limited menu of medications, office-
based therapy and institutional care often result in poor 
outcomes and discourage help-seeking.48 
In addition to their disagreement about the capacity of persons with 
severe mental illness to exercise informed choice regarding medications 
and other treatments, advocates for voluntary care also stress the crucial 
role that resources (or their absence) play in the ability of outpatient mental 
health care providers to successfully manage the chronic relapsing nature 
of their clients’ severe mental illness.49 There is general agreement that the 
development of the community mental health movement in the 1970s and 
the associated process of deinstitutionalization produced a troubling set of 
“unintended consequences.”50 Many patients who had been managed 
within the structured setting of an inpatient hospital ward through the use 
of psychotropic medications proved to be difficult to treat in the 
community.51 The resulting “revolving cycle of failures for some patients”52 
led to a dramatic increase in the number of homeless mentally ill persons, 
as well as an expanding population of mentally ill inmates in jails and 
prisons. Proponents of an increased reliance on outpatient commitment 
argue that the inability of many of these outpatients to remain compliant 
with medication regimens is a consequence of their anosognosia, and the 
lack of insight inherent in their disease. Advocates for voluntary treatment, 
48 Self-Determination, BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, http://www.bazelon.org/ 
Where-We-Stand/Self-Determination.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2015); see also BAZELON CENTER 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW & UPENN COLLABORATIVE ON COMMUNITY INTEGRATION, IN THE 
DRIVER’S SEAT: A GUIDE TO SELF-DIRECTED MENTAL HEALTH CARE 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=OZlEirtDYx4%3d&tabid=104. 
49 See Richard J. Bonnie et al., Mental Health System Transformation After the Virginia Tech 
Tragedy, 28 HEALTH AFF. 793, 801 (2009).  
50 Zanni & Stavis, supra note 45, at 32. “In 1963, Congress passed the Community Mental 
Health Centers Act, which provided funding for the establishment of outpatient treatment 
centers. The CMHC Act was representative of a widespread effort to move the locus of 
treatment from isolated hospitals to the patients’ communities.” SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 
22, at 706. 
51 See Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-
Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101 (1972). 
52 Zanni & Stavis, supra note 45, at 32. 
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on the other hand, argue that the revolving door problem has more to do 
with the federal government’s failure to fully fund the CMHC system and 
the lack of resources in state mental health systems to support the needs of 
an expanding population of deinstitutionalized outpatients.53 
There is equally intense disagreement regarding the second premise 
that drove the reforms of the 1970s, that dangerousness rather than a need 
for treatment should be the principal basis for state intervention in the lives 
of persons with severe mental illness.54 This debate, together with the 
controversy over the question of patient capacity for self-determination, 
has marked the boundaries of the highly polarized policy discussions 
concerning outpatient commitment that are reflected in the reactions to the 
proposed outpatient commitment provisions in the Murphy Bill and other 
state level efforts to adopt or expand the use of outpatient commitment.55 
Critics of the status quo reliance on dangerousness as the key criterion for 
involuntary civil commitment argue that it reflects a category mistake. 
They argue that if involuntary hospitalization is understood as a 
therapeutic intervention, then basing the decision to employ this 
intervention on a showing of imminent dangerousness makes no sense 
because “dangerousness is not a disease or any form of diagnostic entity.”56 
In the view of these critics, “[W]hen a patient is dangerous, it is often 
53 See Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their Incarceration a 
Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157, 157–58, 169  (2000). “Only 
somewhat over half of the projected 2,000 community mental centers have become 
operational.” SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 707.  
54 See generally Darold A. Treffert, The Practical Limits of Patients’ Rights, 5 PSYCHIATRIC 
ANNALS 4 (1975) (writing critically of the “freedom to suffer outside an institution”). 
55 For example, in January 2014, a bill was introduced in the Maryland State Senate that 
would have created a system of outpatient commitment in the state. S.B. 831, 2014 Leg. 434th 
Sess. (Md. 2014). At a February committee meeting, the competing positions were well 
articulated.  The Bill’s sponsor, Senator Dolores Kelley, referred to it as a necessary 
compromise to insure individual safety and welfare; others who spoke in favor included a 
Montgomery County police officer, an advocate for families of persons with mental illness, 
and a physician. Those who spoke in opposition included a representative from the Maryland 
Disability Law Center, a representative from Mental Health America of Maryland, a non-
profit service and education provider, a Baltimore Mental Health Court Judge, and a 
representative from the State’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Hearing on S.B. 831 
Before S. Fin. Comm., 2014 Leg., 434th Sess. (Md. 2014), available at http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/ 
webmga/frmcommittees.aspx?pid=av&tab=subject7 (audio recording accessible through pull-
down menu). A cross-filed bill, although not identical, was introduced in the Maryland House 
of Delegates. H.D. 767, 2014 Leg.,  434th Sess. (Md. 2014).  The Senate bill was placed on hold 
pending the outcome of a task force study ordered by the legislature. The House bill was 
withdrawn.  
56 Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 100 (citing Stephen Rachlin, Civil Commitment, Parens 
Patriae and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 1 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 174, 177 (1979)). 
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because he has inappropriately been allowed to deteriorate, untreated. 
Hospitalization should come before a person slips to this point.”57 
On the other side, proponents of the 1970s reforms argue that 
dangerousness is precisely the right criterion, because the government 
decision at issue is whether to restrain an individual without his or her 
consent. They assert that the question of what, if any, therapeutic measures 
to deploy is a separate matter, and one better resolved by the individual 
himself or herself, or by a substitute decision-maker in those instances in 
which the individual lacks the capacity to provide informed consent.58 In 
any case, these proponents point out, the focus on dangerousness serves to 
limit the exercise of coercive state power, which has the virtues of 
promoting individual autonomy (a deontological good) and encouraging 
persons with behavioral health needs to seek care voluntarily (a 
consequentialist good). An overly paternalistic approach, on the other 
hand, because it provides the basis for more coercive treatment, could 
serve to drive mentally ill individuals away from the treatment system and 
deter their willingness to undertake care voluntarily.59 
Implicit in the debate over the role of dangerousness in this system are 
even more problematic disagreements about the capacity of the mental 
health professions to make reasonably accurate predictions regarding the 
potential of an individual with severe mental illness to engage in violent 
behavior and about whether persons with mental illness are more violence 
prone than other groups in the general population.60 Questions about the 
ability of psychiatrists and other mental health professionals to accurately 
predict future dangerousness became especially contentious some years 
ago in the context of capital sentencing proceedings in which testimony of 
this sort had played a crucial role in jury recommendations in support of 
57 Id. 
58 See BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW & UPENN COLLABORATIVE ON 
COMMUNITY INTEGRATION, supra note 48, at 1. 
59 See id. at 13;  see also Jo C. Phelan et al., Effectiveness and Outcomes of Assisted Outpatient 
Treatment in New York State, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 137, 138 (2010) (“In opposition to 
outpatient commitment, the National Mental Health Association has argued that ‘service can 
only be effective when the consumer embraces it’ and that coercive treatment can have 
negative unintended consequences.”).  In Humphrey v. Cady, the United States Supreme Court, 
in dicta, suggested that involuntary civil commitment ought to be based on a “judgment that 
[the person’s] potential for doing harm, to himself or to others, is great enough to justify such 
a massive curtailment of liberty.” 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). This language proved highly 
influential to lower federal courts that found dangerousness to be a constitutional 
requirement for civil confinement. See, e.g., Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court for Salt Lake 
Cnty., 469 F. Supp. 424, 431–32 (D. Utah 1979).  
60 See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 34 n.106. 
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death sentences.61 While the American Psychiatric Association took the 
position that psychiatrists have no expertise in predicting dangerousness, a 
divided United States Supreme Court in 1983 concluded, in part because 
dangerousness predictions are so essential to involuntary civil commitment 
determinations, that capital sentencing juries should be entitled to rely on 
this evidence.62 
The track record of mental health professionals’ efforts to predict 
future violence has not been good. In their classic 1974 critique, Psychiatry 
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, Bruce Ennis 
and Thomas Litwack relied on substantial data suggesting that clinicians’ 
predictions of dangerousness were likely to be no more accurate than 
chance.63 Indeed, research from the 1970s reported false positive rates 
ranging from 66% to as high as 92%.64 For a variety of reasons, however, 
these critiques may have been overstated to some degree. First, more recent 
research focusing on the use of newer actuarial tools has found that the 
accuracy of clinical predictions of violence has improved somewhat, 
perhaps reducing the rate of false positives below 50%.65 In addition, other 
commentators have pointed out that the reported rate of false positives 
may be inflated because most studies on prediction accuracy rely on 
follow-up police and hospital records that tend to underreport the relevant 
incidents of violent behavior.66 Moreover, because many positive 
determinations of potential dangerousness support a decision to 
institutionalize the patient at issue, some of the relative lack of future 
violence may be due to the structured setting and supervision that 
accompany that decision and may not reflect the rate of dangerous 
behavior that these patients presumably would have exhibited had they 
61 See George E. Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and 
Constitutional Considerations, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1981). 
62 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983).  The APA’s position was set out in its amicus 
brief in Barefoot, and was relied upon by Justice Blackmun in his dissent.  Id. at 916, 920 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Blackmun suggested that the high error rate 
exhibited by experts in predicting dangerousness might be acceptable in civil commitment 
determinations, but not in capital proceedings, given the very different costs of false positives 
in these respective contexts. Id. at 923–24. 
63 See Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: 
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 701 (1974). 
64 See, e.g., Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 439, 451 (1974); Ernest A. Wenk & Robert L. Emrich, Assaultive Youth: An Exploratory 
Study of the Assaultive Experience and Assaultive Potential of California Youth Authority Wards, 9 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 192 (1972). 
65 See John Monahan et al., An Actuarial Model of Violence Risk Assessment for Persons with 
Mental Disorders, 56 PSYCH SERV. 810, 814 (2005). 
66 See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 479. 
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been released directly into the community.67 Finally, a number of writers 
have pointed out that the assessment of error rates in this context must take 
into account the low base rate of violence in the population generally. 
Because the incidence of violent behavior is so low in general, even 
relatively accurate predictions of violence are likely to generate significant 
false positives.68 
In this sense, it may be that psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals actually are fairly good at identifying many of the patients 
who would be likely to act out in dangerous or violent ways in the near 
future. The cost of relying on these assessments, however, is that the 
resulting civil commitment net is likely to ensnare a goodly number of 
others who are not in fact dangerous. Assuming this assumption is sound, 
the question becomes whether the preventative value of positive 
predictions outweighs the harms associated with the inevitable false 
positives.69 If the basis for involuntary confinement is rooted entirely in 
police power concerns with violence prevention, the trade-off of public 
safety versus individual liberty will remain a difficult issue, at least as long 
as there remains a substantial rate of false positives. On the other hand, 
critics who seek to reinvigorate the parens patriae foundations of enforced 
treatment may avoid the dilemma of balancing violence prevention against 
individual autonomy.70 
Honest disagreement over cost-benefit assessment is one feature in the 
complex landscape within which the question of whether to expand the use 
of outpatient commitment arises.71 Unfortunately, not all of the 
67 See George E. Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the “Dangerousness” of “Normal” Criminal 
Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523, 543 (1980). 
68 See Isaac & Brakel, supra note 9, at 104. 
69 As Brakel, Parry, and Weiner explain: 
Lost among all the scientific and not-so-scientific argumentation about 
dangerousness and the talk about “false positives,” and the like is the fact 
that what to do with potentially dangerous persons amounts to a political 
question. . . .  [T]he “community” is likely as a matter of politics to 
disagree with the researchers’ assumption that it must forego detention of 
the 35% or 25% true positives in deference to the liberty interests of the 
“innocent” 65% or 75% . . . . 
BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 36 n.132. 
70 See ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1975). 
71 Lawrence Gostin has suggested that “[t]he inherent prerogative of the state to protect the 
public’s health, safety, and welfare (known as the police powers) is limited by individual 
rights to autonomy, privacy, liberty, property, and other legally protected interests. Achieving 
a just balance . . . poses an enduring problem for public health law.”  Lawrence Gostin, Legal 
Foundations of Public Health Law and its Role in Meeting Future Challenges, 120 PUB. HEALTH 8, 10 
(2006). 
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interconnected issues that drive discussion in this area have been 
disentangled and examined with sufficient care. Not infrequently, 
proposals to increase the use of enforced treatment in the community (or to 
broaden the criteria for involuntary inpatient commitment) are triggered 
by highly salient acts of public violence committed by persons with 
histories of severe mental illness. Thus, the most publicized experiment in 
this area, New York’s Kendra’s Law,72 was passed by the New York 
legislature after Andrew Goldstein, an individual with schizophrenia, 
pushed Kendra Webdale in front of a subway train and caused her death.73 
As others have noted, however, Mr. Goldstein probably would not have 
been subject to Kendra’s Law had it been in place prior to this tragedy 
because he had been seeking treatment for some time and therefore would 
not have met the statute’s eligibility requirements.74 Leaving aside the 
ways in which this law is thus under-inclusive in terms of targeting the 
dangerous mentally ill, it is also likely to be over-inclusive, sweeping up 
persons in the community who are mentally ill and not engaged actively in 
effective treatment, but who do not present an immediate threat.75 The 
question, then, is whether other interests relating to these individuals can 
effectively be served through the mechanism of judicially ordered 
outpatient care, such that the costs associated with such a regime are worth 
the effort. 
One possible interest has to do with addressing the distress 
experienced by the families of chronically mentally ill adults—often young 
adults just leaving adolescence—who fail to adhere to voluntary outpatient 
treatment plans but who do not meet the rigorous standards for 
involuntary inpatient commitment.76 In the absence of clear evidence of 
imminent danger to self or others, even severely decompensated 
individuals who reject voluntary outpatient care or who have difficulty 
accessing scarce outpatient treatment resources may end up burdening 
72 See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG.§ 9.60 (West, Westlaw through L. 2014) (“Kendra’s 
Law”). 
73 See Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 28; see also Marvin S. Swartz, Introduction to the 
Special Section on Assisted Outpatient Treatment in New York State, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 967, 
967 (2010). 
74 See, e.g., SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 795. 
75 This is by definition, as the criteria by which an individual becomes subject to Kendra’s 
Law do not include imminent dangerousness; rather, the law permits an intervention if an 
individual, inter alia, “is in need of assisted outpatient treatment in order to prevent a relapse or 
deterioration which would be likely to result in serious harm to the person or others. . . .” N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG.§ 9.60(c) (emphasis added). 
76 See generally April Groff et al., Caregiving for Persons with Mental Illness: The Impact of 
Outpatient Commitment on Caregiving Strain, 192 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 554, 554–62  
(2004). 
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their families, living on the street, or in jail.77 Proponents of expanded 
outpatient commitment argue that these distressing outcomes can be 
reduced, and this gap in the continuum of care filled, if persons with 
significant histories of mental illness and treatment noncompliance can be 
connected to ongoing treatment, case management, and monitoring 
through the use of judicial hearings and mandated treatment orders.78 
A second, related interest that might be served by an effective system 
of outpatient commitment is held by those charged with managing the 
fiscal and operational needs of the criminal justice system. Advocates for 
assisted outpatient treatment and other forms of outpatient commitment 
point to a dramatic increase in the number of persons with mental illness in 
the criminal justice system even as the population of individuals served in 
the state hospital system has declined over the long course of 
deinstitutionalization.79 Inmates with mental disabilities, particularly 
severe mental illness, are difficult to manage in jails and prisons, are 
especially vulnerable to abuse by guards or other inmates, and are costly to 
care for.80 Thus, if enforced treatment interventions in the community were 
effective in preventing these individuals from becoming enmeshed in the 
criminal system, the costs associated with those interventions might be a 
reasonable investment.81 
There is some empirical evidence that some forms of outpatient 
commitment can lead to reduced rates of criminal conduct on the part of 
participants.82 However, because the relationship between mental illness 
and criminal system involvement is complex, and in most cases not directly 
77 See Virginia A. Hiday et al., Impact of Outpatient Commitment on Victimization of People with 
Severe Mental Illness, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1403, 1403 (2002). 
78 See Zanni & Stavis, supra note 45, at 40. But see Phelan et al., supra note 59, at 137 
(explaining that while the lives of people subject to outpatient commitment were “modestly 
improved,” the data is unclear on whether this measured improvement is the result of 
enhanced treatment and other resources associated with outpatient commitment or with legal 
coercion per se). 
79 See E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE TO GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS 
MENTALLY ILL 5 (1988); E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP & 
THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL, CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY 
ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 40, 50 (1992). 
80 See sources cited supra note 79; see also Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Where 
Mental Illness Meets Brutality in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2014, at A1. 
81 See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Arrests 
Among Persons with Severe Mental Illness?, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 156, 159–60 (2001). 
Certainly, an additional group of individuals with a substantial interest in this regard are 
those persons with chronic mental illness who could be helped to avoid criminal system 
involvement through effective outpatient treatment. See id. 
82 See Allison R. Gilbert et al., Reductions in Arrest Under Assisted Outpatient Treatment in 
New York, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 996, 996–97, 999 (2010). 
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causal,83 the precise criteria by which individuals are included in these 
enforced treatment regimens and the range of services they are offered will 
have a significant impact on their effectiveness in reducing arrests. 
Research suggests that the cohort of offenders whose mental disorders 
directly cause their criminal conduct is comparatively small.84 Individuals 
whose criminal conduct is the product of other factors, either brought 
about by an underlying mental disability or associated with it, such as 
homelessness, low educational attainment, and unemployment, make up a 
much larger category of offenders in the system.85 Finally, the likelihood 
that outpatient commitment will reduce criminal system reinvolvement for 
the substantial group of criminal offenders who suffer both from mental 
illness and co-occurring substance use disorders and/or personality 
disorders is exceedingly problematic. The co-morbidity of these disabilities 
requires intensive and specialized services, and these offenders therefore 
present especially difficult challenges to a system of enforced treatment 
designed to accomplish crime reduction or reduced criminal recidivism.86 
Statutes that set out the criteria for outpatient commitment vary 
considerably among the states.87 A few states rely on a determination that 
the patient is likely to deteriorate if not treated.88 These state laws are 
unlikely to be effective in identifying the individuals most at risk of 
entering the criminal system, given that most mental illness does not 
directly lead to criminal conduct. A more frequent approach requires the 
judge to find that an individual has had one or more prior hospitalizations 
and/or arrests within the relatively recent past, is unlikely to adhere to 
83 See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 528 (2012) 
(stating assumption by supporters of mental health courts of a “causal link” between an 
individual’s mental illness and his or her criminal offense “appears misplaced”).  
84 See Jennifer L. Skeem et al., Correctional Policy for Offenders with Mental Illness: Creating a 
New Paradigm for Recidivism Reduction, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 110, 117 (2011). Some research 
reports that only about 10% of offenders with mental illness engage in criminal conduct as a 
direct consequence of their disability. Id. at 117–18 (identifying a study finding that out of 113 
arrestees with mental illness, “8% had been arrested for offenses that their psychiatric 
symptoms probably-to-definitely caused, either directly (4%) or indirectly (4%)”). 
85 See Johnston, supra note 83, at 566, 573. A significant percentage of offenders with mental 
illness become enmeshed in the criminal justice system because their mental disabilities 
“contributed to their job loss, decline into poverty, and/or movement into environments rife 
with antisocial influences, all generic risk factors for criminal justice involvement.” Id. at 560. 
86 Id. at 559–60 (discussing and citing the findings of William H. Fisher et al., Community 
Mental Health Services and Criminal Justice Involvement Among Persons with Mental Illness, in 
COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS 
43–44 (William H. Fisher ed., 2003)). 
87 See infra text accompanying notes 99–125. 
88 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034 (West, Westlaw through Third 
called Sess. of the 83rd legislature). 
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treatment voluntarily, and is likely to deteriorate as a consequence to the 
point of becoming dangerous or gravely disabled.89 These selection criteria 
are better suited to identifying the group of mentally ill persons in danger 
of entering the criminal system, if only because recent past involvement is 
likely a good predictor of future untoward conduct and may serve as a 
proxy for the other factors that are also predictive, such as homelessness, 
lack of family attachment, and the like.90 A third group of states requires a 
finding that the individual lacks the capacity to make an informed and 
rational decision regarding treatment.91 While potentially relevant to other 
interests that might be served by a system of enforced treatment, 
particularly those founded upon parens patriae principles, these 
jurisdictions are unlikely to select the individuals most at risk of offending 
and entering the criminal system, given that idiosyncratic decision-making 
by itself is not, in most cases, directly related to criminal offending.92 
With respect to the range of services that are provided pursuant to 
judicial order, because mental illness most often does not hold a simple 
causal relationship with criminal system involvement, outpatient 
commitment programs that focus on medication management or that target 
participants’ mental illness in isolation are unlikely to produce substantial 
reductions in criminal conduct.93 Instead, programs that seek to address the 
full range of factors contributing to the dysfunction of participants are 
more likely to have a measurable impact both on their capacity to function 
safely in the community and to avoid criminal system involvement.94 This, 
of course, has significant resource implications for proposals to expand the 
use of outpatient commitment as a means to reduce the number of 
mentally ill individuals who end up in jails and prisons, because simply 
mandating adherence to medication regimens is unlikely to achieve this 
goal. 
A third interest that might be served by a comprehensive system of 
enforced treatment in the community is held both by the individuals whose 
chronic relapsing conditions ensnare them in the revolving door of the 
public mental health system, and by those charged with operating that 
system. The individual rights-focused approach to regulating state 
89 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:66 (A) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). 
90 See Skeem et al., supra note 84, at 117–18. 
91 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1) (LexisNexis through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
92 See Johnston, supra note 83, at 573. 
93 See id. at 573 (“[T]he provision of mental health treatment alone is not an effective 
strategy for reducing the recidivism of offenders with mental illnesses.”). 
94 See Skeem et al., supra note 84, at 121 (“[T]he effectiveness of correctional programs in 
reducing recidivism is positively associated with the number of criminogenic needs they 
target”). 
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interventions came under pressure in the 1980s, most notably in the form 
of Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric Hospitalization of Adults 
recommended by the American Psychiatric Association (the APA). The 
guidelines recognize that many patients discharged from inpatient care to 
the community suffer deteriorating mental health over time because they 
fail to engage or adhere to effective treatment.95 The APA’s Guidelines 
would permit commitment when an individual “will if not treated suffer or 
continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical 
distress, and this distress is associated with significant impairment of his 
judgment, reason, or behavior causing a substantial deterioration of his 
previous ability to function on his own.”96 The APA has stated that this 
provision is intended to permit the commitment of “severely mentally ill 
individuals who are moving toward sudden collapse” and that it applies to 
a group “commonly excluded from the mental health system by current 
legal standards.”97 
In recent years, a small but significant minority of states have absorbed 
this “potential-for-deterioration” ground into their civil commitment 
provisions (either for inpatient commitment, outpatient commitment, or 
both) although there has not been a general return to the “need for 
treatment” approach that dominated before 1970.98 Clearly, decision 
makers in these jurisdictions have concluded that parens patriae-based 
interventions may improve the functioning and quality of life of 
individuals with chronic mental illness, both in the short and longer terms, 
and may also yield longer-term police power benefits in preventing 
dangerousness, and are therefore worth the costs to patient autonomy. The 
mechanics by which this policy shift is effectuated are important, however, 
particularly when the deterioration ground functions as a basis for 
outpatient commitment. In order to facilitate analysis of these questions of 
implementation, a consideration of the statutory context within which this 
policy choice is made follows. 
95 See American Psychiatric Association, Guidelines for Legislation on the Psychiatric 
Hospitalization of Adults, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 672 (1983). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-457 of the 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d) (West, Westlaw 2014 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005(1)(e)(iv) (West, Westlaw 2014 Reg. Sess.); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. § 574.034 (West, Westlaw through third called session of the 83rd legislature). 
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II. Overview of State Law Approaches to Outpatient Commitment 
In general terms, there are three different models of outpatient 
commitment.99 All three models involve a legal order requiring a patient to 
report regularly to a community clinic or other community-based provider 
for treatment.100 The first model, conditional release, permits outpatient 
commitment only after some form of inpatient commitment.101 This back-
end commitment model is authorized in a number of states and permits the 
release of an individual on the condition that he or she adhere to a 
specified outpatient treatment regimen.102 In most cases, failure to comply 
can result in the individual being returned to inpatient status.103 
The second model permits the front-end commitment of an individual 
to community-based outpatient treatment without any preliminary 
requirement of inpatient treatment, but on the same eligibility criteria as 
those governing inpatient commitment.104 At least twenty-five states have 
adopted this approach.105 This second model can be further subdivided 
into two variations. The first variation provides for either inpatient or 
outpatient commitment on the same libertarian grounds that have 
dominated the law for some time. While states with this kind of law 
provide for outpatient commitment, their provisions do not reach 
individuals whose illness has not progressed to the point where a court 
could plausibly find by clear and convincing evidence that they pose a 
99 This section provides a brief overview of the legal approaches adopted around the 
country for mandating the treatment of persons with serious mental disabilities, and places 
the various outpatient commitment provisions in that context. Necessarily, this overview 
presents information in general terms and does not focus on the many details that distinguish 
one state’s legal regime from another’s. 
100 See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 791. 
101 See generally SAMUEL BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 205–08. 
102 Id. at 231–34 (identifying forty states that maintain statutory arrangements providing for 
the conditional release of inpatients from psychiatric hospitals). 
103 A number of state and lower federal courts, relying on the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), in which the Court held that due 
process requirements apply to the revocation of parole in the criminal justice context, have 
held that some formal process is required before the revocation of the conditional release of a 
psychiatric patient can be effectuated. See, e.g., True v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 645 
P.2d 891, 93–94 (Idaho 1982). But see Dietrich v. Brooks, 558 P.2d 357, 361 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) 
(distinguishing parole and permitting summary revocation of conditional release).  
104 See Amy Allbright et al., Outpatient Civil Commitment Laws: An Overview, 26 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 179, 179 (2002). 
105 The states in this group include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of 
Colombia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Nevada, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
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danger to self or others, or are gravely disabled.106 Twenty-one states fall 
into this category.107 The alternative variation of the second model again 
permits either inpatient or outpatient commitment on the basis of identical 
eligibility criteria, but permits either form of commitment on grounds that 
go beyond the traditional libertarian standard to include a potential-for-
deterioration alternative.108 Several states have adopted this approach, 
although there is considerable variation in how the deterioration criterion 
is set out.109 
As a conceptual matter, the decision of a state legislature to provide for 
either inpatient or outpatient commitment on the same substantive 
standard may reflect an  effort to implement the least restrictive alternative 
doctrine.110 The legislatures in some states have sought to accomplish a 
similar result not by providing for front-end outpatient commitment, but 
by including a least restrictive alternative criterion in the statutory 
provisions governing inpatient commitment.111 
106 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-329(11) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Second Reg. 
Sess. of the 62nd Idaho Legislature) (if patient is deemed mentally ill and, because of such 
condition, is found likely to injure self or others (or gravely disabled), the court shall order 
treatment for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed one year); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 632.350(5) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Reg. Sess. of the 97th Gen. Assemb.) (court 
must find that patient presents a likelihood of serious harm to self or others and that a 
program appropriate to handle patient’s condition has agreed to accept him or her; outpatient 
treatment under supervision of mental health program in least restrictive environment shall 
not exceed 180 days); 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7304(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. 
Sess.) (court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the patient poses a clear and 
present danger to self or others); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-1-2 (West, Westlaw through the 
2014 Reg. Sess.) (a person is subject to involuntary commitment if the person has a severe 
mental illness, is a danger to self and others, and is likely to benefit from treatment).   
107 These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Colombia, 
Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
108 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. legislation) 
(a mentally ill person is eligible for involuntary treatment if one or more of the following are 
demonstrated: dangerous to self or others; unable to provide for basic personal needs, or a 
person who has twice been placed in a hospital or inpatient facility in the past three years, is 
exhibiting behavior similar to that which preceded those incidents, and will likely deteriorate 
without treatment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 7611 (West, Westlaw through the laws of the 
Adjourned Sess. of the 2013-2014 Vt. Gen. Assemb.) (includes provision for “patient in need of 
further treatment” that covers patients receiving adequate treatment but who will deteriorate 
if it is discontinued). 
109 These states include North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, and Virginia. 
110 See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 791. 
111 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation) (no 
person shall be involuntarily treated unless he or she presents a danger to self, family, or 
others as a result of mental illness, can reasonably benefit from treatment, and for whom such 
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The third model of outpatient commitment can be thought of as a form 
of “preventive commitment.”112 This model, operative in more than a 
dozen states,113 while also permitting front-end outpatient commitment,114 
utilizes eligibility criteria that depart from (and generally are less 
libertarian than) the jurisdiction’s inpatient commitment provisions.115 The 
treatment is the least restrictive alternative); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 10-632(e)(2) 
(West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assemb.).  
112 See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 791. 
113 These States are Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, and Texas. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & Ken Kress, Outpatient Commitment: A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 107, 111 (2003). 
114 Outpatient commitments need not, however, be front-ended under this model.  In New 
York State, for example, a great many “Assisted Outpatient Treatment” orders are arranged as 
a “step down” from inpatient care.  The 2009 Program Evaluation for New York’s Kendra’s 
Law reported that “in nearly three-quarters of all cases, it is actually used as a discharge 
planning tool for hospitalized patients.  Thus, AOT is largely used as a transition plan to 
improve the effectiveness of treatment following a hospitalization . . .”  Marvin S. Swartz et 
al., New York State Assisted Outpatient Treatment Program Evaluation, OFFICE OF MENTAL 
HEALTH at vi (June 30, 2009), http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/resources/publications/ 
aot_program_evaluation/report.pdf. 
115 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5246 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) 
(person must suffer from mental illness to the extent that noncompliance has resulted in 
hospitalization or mental health services at a correctional facility at least twice in past thirty-
six months or at least one violent act or threat in past forty-eight months; must be the least 
restrictive placement and be likely to benefit the patient); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4655(1) (West, 
Westlaw through the 2014 Sp. “A” Sess.) (person may be ordered to involuntary outpatient 
placement upon a court finding that the person has a mental illness, history of noncompliance 
(at least twice been admitted in past thirty-six months or engaged in at least one violent act in 
past thirty-six months), and is likely to benefit from the proposed treatment); GA. CODE ANN. 
§37-3-1(12.1) (LexisNexis through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (person must be mentally ill and require 
such treatment to avoid predictably and imminently becoming an inpatient; the patient’s  
mental status must make him or her unable to voluntarily seek or comply with treatment); 405 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-119.1 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (person is eligible if 
he or she meets criteria for inpatient commitment and yet treatment can be reasonably 
ensured by court mandating outpatient care, or absence of treatment is reasonably expected to 
increase symptoms to the point that person would meet criteria for commitment); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 28:66(A) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (a patient may be ordered to 
outpatient treatment if suffering from mental illness, unlikely to participate in treatment, such 
treatment is necessary to avoid relapse, it is likely patient will benefit, and patient has history 
of noncompliance (at least twice in past thirty-six months, it was significant factor in 
hospitalization or mental health services at correctional facility or has engaged in one or more 
violent acts, attempts, or threats in the past thirty-six months)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
330.1401(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (person may qualify for outpatient 
commitment based upon a showing of failure to meet basic needs, impaired judgment that 
makes the patient unable to understand the need for treatment, or noncompliance history 
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so-called “Assisted Outpatient Commitment” (AOT) statutes are included 
within this group.116 
With respect to statutes in the second and third category that go 
beyond the criteria of dangerousness or grave disability, outpatient 
commitment is often based on a prediction that the person will deteriorate 
into dangerousness or will become gravely disabled if treatment is not 
engaged and maintained. Notwithstanding this common focus, state 
legislatures have developed a variety of triggers, beyond the traditional 
civil commitment criteria, for determining which individuals with mental 
disabilities will be subject to this more aggressive form of intervention. 
Recognizing that the following categorical descriptions work a bit of 
homogenization given the actual level of legal variation in these 
provisions, it is fair to say that the following types of triggers are most 
common: 
(A) The individual is unable to make a rational, informed decision 
about treatment.117 This criterion is, in effect, a kind of competency 
determination not unlike the legal standard that frequently 
within past forty-eight months (at least two institutionalizations or at least one violent act)); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.065(5) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (allows for “early 
intervention” treatment on the following criteria: refusal to accept appropriate treatment; 
mental illness manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions; 
and either interference with ability to care for self or past history with inpatient treatment (at 
least two times in past three years, exhibiting symptoms substantially similar, and reasonably 
expected to deteriorate)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (West, Westlaw through End of 2013 
Reg. Sess.) (a court may order outpatient commitment on the basis of clear and convincing 
evidence that the patient lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make decisions about treatment 
or if there is a likelihood of serious harm as manifested by threats or attempts of physical 
harm); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §574.034 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Third Called 
Sess. of the 83rd Legislature) (judge may order outpatient treatment only if appropriate 
mental health services are available to the patient and the judge finds clear and convincing 
evidence that the mental illness is severe and persistent, and if not treated will lead to 
deterioration of the ability to function independently; when determining eligibility for 
outpatient rather than inpatient treatment, the court may look at any actions occurring within 
the two years preceding the hearing).   
116 See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 9.60(C) (West, Westlaw through 2014) (“Kendra’s Law”) 
(A court may order AOT if it finds that a patient is suffering from a mental illness and is 
unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision. In addition, there must be a 
history of noncompliance, such that mental illness was a significant factor necessitating 
hospitalization or mental health services at a correctional facility in the past thirty-six months 
or resulted in one or more acts of violent behavior toward self or others in the past forty-eight 
months. The treatment must be necessary to avoid relapse resulting in harm to self or others). 
117 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-457 of the 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580(A)(1). 
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governs the appointment of a guardian for the purposes of 
directing the medical care of a disabled individual.118 
(B) The individual has a history of mental illness that has either: (1) at 
least twice within a specified period of time been a significant 
factor in necessitating hospitalization or receipt of mental health 
services in a correctional facility; or (2) resulted in one or more acts, 
attempts, or threats of serious violent behavior toward self or 
others within a specified time period.119 
(C) The individual, as a result of his or her mental illness, is unlikely to 
voluntarily participate in treatment but would likely benefit from 
such treatment.120 
(D) The individual, if he or she does not receive treatment, will 
continue to deteriorate and will either become impaired in his or 
her ability to function independently or will become imminently 
dangerous to himself or herself or others.121 
(E) The individual is unlikely to survive safely in the community 
without support or supervision.122 
These triggering criteria appear in the state statutes in a variety of 
combinations and configurations. A few states focus particularly on D, a 
determination that the patient is likely to deteriorate if not treated.123 A 
more frequent combination is B, C, D, which requires the decision-maker to 
find that the individual has had past difficulties, is unlikely to adhere to 
treatment voluntarily, and is likely to deteriorate as a consequence to the 
point of becoming dangerous or gravely disabled.124 Other states have 
118 See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 14, at 378–85. 
119 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4655(1)(e); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 28:66(A)(4); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(1)(d); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 
§ 9.60(C)(4).  
120 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4655(1)(h); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 28:66(A)(4); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817 (West, Westlaw through the End of 2014 Reg. 
Sess.).  
121 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 426.005(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
574.034(b) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature). 
122 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346(a)(3); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4655(1)(b); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 122C-263(d) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG.  § 9.60(C). 
123 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 394.4655(1)(b).  
124 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:66(A); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401(1)(d). 
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adopted the combination of statutory criteria A, C, D, which includes a 
required finding that the individual lacks the capacity to make an informed 
and rational decision.125 Interestingly, virtually no state has adopted both 
the A and B-type criteria. Thus, jurisdictions that require a finding of past 
difficulties generally do not explicitly require a finding of decisional 
incapacity and vice versa. 
III. Funding, Implementation, and Enforcement Issues 
With these general patterns in mind, several issues presented by 
outpatient commitment are worth considering. The first has to do with 
resources. The Kaiser Family Foundation has estimated that in fiscal year 
2010, the fifty states spent nearly $38,000,000,000 overall on mental health 
services.126 The states receive some support for community mental health 
through funding obtained under federal mental health and community 
service block grants.127 Nevertheless, given the pressure in many states and 
at the federal level to expand community-based mental health treatment 
and to increase the use of outpatient civil commitment, this level of 
funding remains inadequate to meet the needs of all those who require 
treatment and other associated services.128 There are important questions 
about how the states allocate these limited resources to achieve the various 
goals identified by advocates for effective behavioral health care in the 
community. For example, in many rural states the expansion of outpatient 
treatment and the proposed increase in the use of outpatient commitment 
would require an increase in physician employment and retention 
programs—as well as programs to train and support other clinicians—to 
ensure that there are enough mental health providers to serve the needs of 
the state.129 For more urban states, funding is needed to expand community 
health centers.130 
125 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1). 
126 State Mental Health Agency (SMHA) Mental Health Services Expenditures, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/smha-expenditures/#table (last visited Feb. 5, 
2015). 
127 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., FUNDING CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIES 60 (2009), available at 
http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content/SMA11-4655/SMA11-4655.pdf. 
128 See Strengthening Mental Health In Our Communities Act of 2014, H.R. 4574, 113th 
Cong. (2014). 
129 See, e.g., MONT. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., BLOCK GRANT APPLICATION: 
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH PLAN AND REPORT (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/ 
Portals/85/amdd/documents/CMHBG-application.pdf; State-Designated Shortage Areas: 
Psychiatry & Mental Health, NEBRASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (2013), available at 
http://dhhs.ne.gov/publichealth/Documents/StateShortageAreasPSYCH2013.pdf. 
130 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare Budget Request for FY 2014-2015, 
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Few statutes authorizing outpatient commitment provide funding for 
new or dedicated treatment resources or even provide that individuals 
subject to outpatient commitment should be accorded priority in accessing 
the community-based resources that are already in place. By contrast, 
Kendra’s Law was “unique in that the intent of the statute [was] not simply 
to authorize court-ordered community treatment, but also to provide the 
resources and oversight necessary for a viable, less restrictive alternative to 
involuntary hospitalization.”131 Thus, the law included an appropriation of 
$32,000,000 directly allocated to the program and $125,000,000 for 
enhanced community services.132 
Because patients subject to an outpatient commitment order under 
Kendra’s Law receive preference for intensive case management services 
and assertive community treatment services, concerns were raised that the 
law would divert needed resources from other individuals who voluntarily 
seek community-based treatment, even with the enhanced resources 
provided in the legislation and its reauthorization.133 Researchers who have 
studied this issue of “queue jumping” have come to a mixed set of 
conclusions.134 Apparently, in the first three or four years of the regime, the 
preference given to patients subject to outpatient commitment under the 
statute (AOT patients) “may have crowded out some individuals with 
serious mental illness who did not meet criteria for outpatient 
commitment.”135 Thereafter, as “new AOT orders leveled off in the state 
and then declined,” the increased capacity of the system became available 
to non-AOT patients.136 Looking ahead, because the expanded treatment 
and service capacity created by passage of Kendra’s Law is now fully 
utilized in New York, “competition for services in the near future may 
intensify, with unknown effects on AOT relative to non-AOT recipients.”137 
In 2012, the State of New Jersey allocated $3,000,000 to five regional 
behavioral health centers to implement involuntary outpatient 
commitment care. In addition, approximately $32,000,000 was earmarked 
for community-based treatment and housing services.138 In many other 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE BUDGET REQUEST: MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. (2014), available at 
http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/cs/groups/webcontent/documents/report/p_010997.pdf.  
131 Swartz, supra note 73, at 967. 
132 E.g., Swartz et al., supra note 114, at 46. 
133 See id. at viii; Swartz, supra note 73, at 968.  
134 See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Did New York State’s Outpatient 
Commitment Program Crowd Out Voluntary Service Recipients?, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 988, 
993–94 (2010). 
135 Swartz, supra note 73, at 968. 
136 Swartz et al., supra note 114, at viii. 
137 Id. 
138 Press Release, State of New Jersey Department of Human Services, DHS Launches 
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states, however, the adoption of outpatient commitment provisions has not 
been linked to the legislative appropriation of substantial new treatment 
resources or other service capacity. This has been the case even in a 
number of jurisdictions that require adequate community-based resources 
as a condition for an outpatient treatment order.139 
In Maine, significant funding has been directed to assertive community 
treatment (“ACT”) efforts and to other “evidence-based” community 
treatment practices.140 Consistent with this policy decision, Maine’s 
inpatient commitment statute requires the court to find specifically “that 
adequate community resources for care and treatment of the person’s 
mental illness are unavailable” before an individual can be involuntarily 
hospitalized.141 Further, the state’s outpatient commitment provision only 
permits such outpatient commitment if the court is able to find that 
“community resources are available to support the treatment plan.”142 
Similarly, in Texas, the governing statute only permits a court to order 
community-based treatment if it finds “that appropriate mental health 
services are available to the patient.”143 In Virginia, if the community 
service coordinator responsible for developing a comprehensive 
mandatory outpatient treatment plan “determines that the services 
necessary for the treatment of the person’s mental illness are not available 
or cannot be provided to the person in accordance with the order for 
mandatory outpatient treatment,” the statute directs the agency to send the 
matter back to the court for further review.144 In yet another variation on 
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment (IOC) (May 24, 2012), http://www.state.nj.us/human 
services/news/press/2012/approved/20120524.html. 
139 As the New York State evaluators put it: “Because the implementation of the AOT 
Program in New York was accompanied by an infusion of new services, it is impossible to 
generalize these findings to states where services do not simultaneously increase.” Swartz et 
al., supra note 114, at viii. Dr. Jo Phelan and her colleagues, in the course of considering the 
potential positive impact that coerced outpatient treatment might produce, have made a 
similar observation in concluding that Kendra’s Law has yielded some promising outcomes: 
“[I]t is important that our findings be viewed through the lens of the overall effect of 
outpatient commitment and not the effects of legal coercion per se. Assisted outpatient 
treatment is a ‘package deal’ that includes coerced treatment but also access to enhanced 
services.” Phelan et al., supra note 59, at 142. 
140 See ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., BLOCK GRANT APPLICATION (Feb. 6, 2013), 
available at http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/samhs/mentalhealth/blockgrant/MHBlockGrant 
ApplicationFY%202014Final083013.pdf. 
141 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864(6)(A) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Second Reg. 
Sess. of the 126th Legislature). 
142 Id. at § 3873-A(1)(D). 
143 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Third Called 
Sess. of the 83rd legislature). 
144 VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(H) (West, Westlaw through the End of 2014 Reg. Sess. and 
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this theme, assisted outpatient treatment in California is authorized only in 
those counties that have adopted state legislation known as “Laura’s 
Law,”145 which obligates local government to provide necessary 
community-based services.146 No statewide funding on the order of that 
associated with Kendra’s Law in New York has been made available in 
California to support its outpatient commitment statute. 
A second issue worth noting is the effect, if any, that a patient’s prior 
disposition toward treatment is permitted to have on a court’s decision to 
order outpatient treatment. This concern over protecting the patient’s 
interest in self-determination is reflected in the Minnesota statute 
authorizing outpatient commitment.147 In addition to other more familiar 
criteria, the statute permits “early intervention treatment” upon a judicial 
finding that “the proposed patient, when competent, would have chosen 
substantially similar treatment under the same circumstances.”148 This 
provision reflects a perspective that Elyn Saks has termed the “Different 
Person Theory” of competency, which focuses on the changes in 
personality and decisional capacity that acute mental illness may bring 
about. In Saks’s account, a person’s capacity should be judged not on an 
external objective standard of reasonableness but on whether, given her 
values and beliefs, the individual has been “transformed by mental illness 
into a different person,” so that we can say, “she is simply not herself.”149 
Consistent with this perspective, the Minnesota statute permits the 
imposition of outpatient treatment notwithstanding the patient’s present 
reluctance, on the ground that his or her authentic self would have 
consented absent the distortions introduced by acute mental illness. Also 
consistent with this notion of future consent is a provision in New York’s 
AOT statute, which provides that “[i]f the [patient] has executed a health 
care proxy . . . any directions included in such proxy [shall be taken into 
account by the court in determining] the written treatment plan.”150 
includes cc. 1 and 2 from the 2014 Sp. S. I). 
145 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5046 (West). 
146 See 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1847 (West); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346(a) (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 931 of 2014 Reg.Sess.). In California the funding for involuntary 
outpatient commitment occurs through “Medi-Cal,” California’s state based Medicaid 
program. There are concerns regarding the spending for outpatient services considering the 
expansion of Medicaid services within the state.  See CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, 
CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE ALMANAC: MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN CALIFORNIA: PAINTING A 
PICTURE (2013), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/ 
M/PDF%20MentalHealthPaintingPicture.pdf. 
147 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.065(5)(b)(3)(i) (West, Westlaw through end of 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
148 Id.  
149 Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 959 (1991). 
150 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 9.60(C)(8) (West,  Westlaw through 2014). 
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A third important issue has to do with the relationship between the 
findings required for outpatient commitment and those typically 
associated with a judicial determination of incompetence and the 
appointment of a guardian. Virtually all of the state provisions that 
authorize outpatient commitment for persons who are not dangerous 
either explicitly or implicitly require a finding that the individual is 
unlikely to voluntarily participate in needed treatment.151 Even if the 
decision to forego treatment is  objectively a bad decision from the point of 
view of the costs and benefits involved, however, the rules in many states 
governing competency determinations generally require more than a bad 
(or even a very bad) decision. Often, they also require a finding of impaired 
capacity to engage in a rational decision-making process.152 In light of this 
emphasis on the capacity of individuals to weigh and consider alternatives, 
it is significant that not all states with outpatient commitment laws require 
the court to make specific findings of decisional incapacity.153 
Of the commitment statutes that do require the court to make specific 
findings, perhaps the most elaborate is in Wisconsin, where the law 
permits a court to determine an individual’s dangerousness by finding that 
he or she: 
evidences either incapability of expressing an understanding of 
the advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or 
treatment and the alternatives, or substantial incapability of 
applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and 
alternatives to his or her mental illness in order to make an 
informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or 
treatment . . . .154 
151 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1) (Lexis through the 2013 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 28:66(A) (2008). 
152 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 5 (West, Westlaw through 2013). The traditional approach 
for determining incompetency leading to the appointment of a guardian was focused on 
whether the individual was capable of making decisions that produce reasonable outcomes. A 
number of states, however, have adopted an alternative approach, developed as part of the 
Uniform Probate Code, which shifts the emphasis from reasonable outcomes to the soundness 
of the individual’s decision-making process itself. See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 947.   
153 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005(1)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
154 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(1)(a)(2)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013). A somewhat less 
detailed provision of this type can be found in Arizona as well. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
36-501(5) (West, Westlaw through the Second Reg. and Second Special Sesss. of the 51st 
legislature) (“‘Danger to others’ means that the judgment of a person who has a mental 
disorder is so impaired that the person is unable to understand the person’s need for 
treatment and as a result of the person’s mental disorder the person’s continued behavior can 
reasonably be expected, on the basis of competent medical opinion, to result in serious 
physical harm.”). 
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision upholding the 
constitutionality of this provision, In re Commitment of Dennis H., noted in 
part that the statute is within the State’s parens patriae powers precisely 
because it is directed to individuals found incapable of making effective 
treatment decisions.155 By contrast, the New York state court decision 
upholding Kendra’s Law, In re K.L., rejected the respondent’s argument 
that the law’s failure to require proof that he lacked capacity to make 
treatment decisions, as in the Wisconsin statute, rendered it 
unconstitutional.156 In part, the New York court based its decision on its 
determination that “a violation of the order, standing alone, ultimately 
carries no sanction, . . . [but] simply triggers heightened scrutiny on the 
part of the physician, who must then determine whether the patient may 
be in need of involuntary hospitalization [under the ordinary standards 
applicable for inpatient commitment].”157 A patient’s compliance with 
treatment ordered under Kendra’s Law rests, then, as the New York court 
stated, on the “compulsion generally felt by law-abiding citizens to comply 
with court directives,” and on the possibility of being subject to a seventy-
two hour hospitalization for evaluation.158 
The New York decision highlights the problematic nature of enforcing 
compliance with an outpatient commitment order. Many states have 
statutory provisions that address the consequences facing individuals who 
do not comply with outpatient commitment. In a number of these states, a 
permissible consequence is a return of the noncompliant individual to an 
inpatient facility, either for evaluation or ongoing treatment.159 Some 
155 See In re Commitment of Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Wis. 2002). As Justice Sykes 
explained: “Mentally ill persons who meet the fifth standard's definition are clearly dangerous 
to themselves because their incapacity to make informed medication or treatment decisions 
makes them more vulnerable to severely harmful deterioration than those who are competent 
to make such decisions. The state has a strong interest in providing care and treatment before 
that incapacity results in a loss of ability to function.” Id. at 862. 
156 In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 484 (N.Y. 2004). 
157 Id. at 485. 
158 Id. 
159 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.795 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective 
June 24, 2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 I(4); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-26-14-4 to 14-5 
(West, Westlaw with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second Reg. Sess. and Second Reg. 
Technical Sess. of the 118th Gen. Assemb.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.097 (West, Westlaw with 
legislation through the end of the 2014 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-74 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 Reg. and First and Second Extraordinary Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-
03.1-21 (West, Westlaw through chapter 522 (end) of the 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 63rd Legislative 
Assembly); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.275(3) (West, Westlaw through chapter 522 (end) of the 
2013 Reg. Sess. of the 63rd Legislative Assembly); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (West, Westlaw 
through End of 2013 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-637 (West, Westlaw through 2014 
Gen. Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110 (West, Westlaw though the 
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jurisdictions require a hearing before the individual is transferred,160 and 
most require that the individual meet the statutory standard for inpatient 
commitment before involuntary hospitalization is permitted.161 
Remarkably, at least a half dozen states’ statutes fail entirely to address  the 
question of enforcement.162 
Generally, a patient’s failure to adhere to an outpatient commitment 
order, standing alone, cannot be the basis for inpatient commitment. 
Further, the law in several jurisdictions precludes the use of an individual’s 
noncompliance as evidence for purposes of meeting the standard for 
inpatient commitment.163 While statutes in a few other states take the 
opposite approach and permit a showing of noncompliance to serve as 
some evidence that involuntary inpatient treatment is necessary,164 if the 
noncompliant patient is not imminently dangerous or otherwise subject to 
involuntary hospitalization, there may be no realistic remedy for the 
patient’s refusal to comply with ordered community-based treatment.165 In 
theory, such noncompliance could be subject to a proceeding for contempt, 
but it is unlikely that such an approach is often pursued. In fact, some state 
legislatures have expressly prohibited using an individual’s failure to 
comply with outpatient commitment as grounds for an order of 
contempt.166 
2014 Budget Sess.). 
160 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.097; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 25-03.1-21; S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 44-17-580.  
161 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.3(f) (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-457 of the 2014 Reg. 
Sess.); D.C. CODE  § 21-548 (LexisNexis through laws effective as of May 19, 2014, and through 
D.C. Act 20-306); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-933 (LexisNexis through the 2013 103rd First Sess. 
Annots. Westlaw through Sept. 6, 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.323 (LexisNexis through the 
Seventy-Seventh (2013) and the Twenty-Seventh Special (2013) Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-
817.1 (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg. Sess. and Acts 2014, Sp. Sess. I, c. 2, of the Gen. 
Assemb. Annots.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-2 (LexisNexis through the 2014 Reg., First and 
Second Extraordinary Sess.). 
162 These states include Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Missouri, 
Montana, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL 
HEALTH LAW, INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT: SUMMARY OF STATUTES 3, 5–6, 17–18, 
23, 26, 28, 30  (2000), available at http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CBmFgyA4i 
-w%3D&tabid=324. 
163 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:71(G) (LexisNexis through 2013 ); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 
9.60(n) (West, Westlaw through 2014). 
164 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2. 
165 Cf. Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 26 (“Without clearly defined steps for 
implementation, an outpatient commitment order can be likened to a message in a bottle—a 
cry for help at risk of non-delivery.”). 
166 See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 9.60(n); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.037(c)(3) 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Third Called Session of 83rd Leg.). 
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Some state laws seek to identify measures short of involuntary 
hospitalization that courts might deploy to encourage adherence to 
outpatient treatment requirements. In Maine, for example, a reviewing 
court is permitted to incentivize the process by removing restrictions on 
the patient in exchange for his or her achievement of specified goals under 
the treatment plan.167 In Indiana, if an individual is unable to comply with 
an outpatient commitment order, the court is authorized to put in place 
other treatment options, including supervised group living, as an 
alternative to full inpatient commitment.168 For the most part, however, 
most outpatient commitment schemes rely, as the court in In re K.L put it, 
on the “compulsion generally felt by law-abiding citizens to comply with 
court directives.”169 Proponents argue that leveraging the “power of the 
robe” for therapeutic purpose in this fashion is an entirely appropriate 
strategy for assisting the small number of treatment-resistant chronic 
patients who otherwise would cycle through the system disrupting their 
communities and drawing unnecessarily on limited resources.170 Critics 
charge that it is not ethical for care providers to collude in suggesting to 
patients that negative legal consequences may be imposed for non-
adherence, when in fact no such consequences are likely or even possible in 
many jurisdictions.171 As Hoge and Grottole have put it: “A strategy that 
relies on patient misinformation to foster its success violates ethics 
167 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3873-A(7) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Second 
Reg. Sess. of the 126th Leg.). 
168 IND. CODE ANN. § 12-26-14-4(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Second Reg. Sess. 
and Technical Sess. of the 118th Gen. Assemb., P.L. 1 through P.L. 226). 
169 In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 485 (N.Y. 2004). 
170 See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER BACKGROUNDER: NO RELEVANCE TO ASSISTED 
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (AOT) IN THE OCTET STUDY OF ENGLISH COMPULSORY TREATMENT  
(2014), available at http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/Research/may 
2013-octet-study.pdf [hereinafter TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER]. 
The theory behind the black-robe effect is that a judicial process and a 
judge’s imprimatur increase the likelihood that the patient will take to 
heart the need to adhere to prescribed treatment.  It is not a single factor 
but a host of related ones that combine to send a potent message: the 
ritual of being summoned to court and taking part in a hearing, the 
recognition that a fair-minded third party has listened to both sides and 
ultimately agreed with clinicians that assisted treatment is warranted, the 
cultural perception of the judge as an authority figure, and the inclination 
of many judges to use their bench as a sort of civic pulpit. 
Id. 
171 See Michael A. Hoge & Elizabeth Grottole, The Case Against Outpatient Commitment, 28 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 165, 166 (2000). 
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principles, the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship, and the notion of 
informed consent.”172 
In the final analysis, the perceived or actual coercion experienced by 
individuals subject to an outpatient commitment order may be less 
important than the legal obligation such orders create for community 
providers, case managers, and others responsible for implementing the 
mandated therapeutic regimen.173 While the available outcome studies are 
not entirely conclusive on the positive effects that outpatient commitment 
has on individual patients,174 they do, on balance, suggest that these 
interventions may produce some overall improvements in relevant metrics 
such as frequency and length of subsequent hospitalizations, involvement 
in the criminal justice system, and the like.175 As some thoughtful 
researchers have cautioned, however, these positive data may or may not 
be directly attributable to the coercion inherent in outpatient commitment, 
and may instead be the result of the increased resources, monitoring, and 
coordination inherent in this approach.176 
IV. Outcome Studies: The Effectiveness of Outpatient Commitment 
There are relatively few controlled studies that measure the 
effectiveness of outpatient commitment practices. Some of the non-
controlled studies are of limited value given the difficulties in making 
comparisons across study groups with dissimilar characteristics and the 
dangers of selection effects “whereby clinicians and courts select patients 
for a predicted good outcome.”177 A comprehensive evaluation of the 
experience under Kendra’s Law, mandated by the New York state 
legislature as part of its reauthorization process, however, does provide a 
more detailed picture of the effects of mandated outpatient treatment, at 
least under the conditions that pertain in New York.178 This evaluation, as 
well as research from several other states, suggests that outpatient 
commitment can reduce either the rate of hospital readmissions, the length 
of such inpatient stays, or both, and provides some evidence that enforced 
172 Id. at 167. 
173 See Zanni & Stavis, supra note 45, at 37 (“Committed patients tend to receive additional 
staff attention . . . .”). 
174 See infra text accompanying notes 177–84. 
175 See Phelan et al., supra note 59, at 141–42; Zanni & Stavis, supra note 45, at 34–37. 
176 Zanni & Stavis, supra note 45, at 37 (“Additional research is needed to study the 
causative factors underlying committed patients’ improvements, namely, does having an 
outpatient commitment order garner additional community services or does the threat of 
judicial intervention improve treatment compliance?”). 
177 Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 26. 
178 See Swartz et al., supra note 114. 
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outpatient treatment can, in some circumstances, improve the quality of life 
and overall functioning of participants.179 
One of the earliest controlled studies, conducted by researchers at 
Duke University, involved individuals with serious mental illness in North 
Carolina who were discharged from inpatient treatment between 1993 and 
1996.180 A small number of the 331 patients in the study who had a recent 
history of violent behavior were placed in a nonrandomized comparison 
group. The remaining 264 study subjects were randomly assigned either to 
an experimental group that received outpatient commitment or a control 
group that did not receive outpatient commitment but did receive the same 
community-based treatment, case management, and other services as the 
experimental group.181 The researchers reported no statistically significant 
difference between the two groups in terms of re-hospitalization rates, 
days of hospitalization, arrest, or homelessness during the first six months 
following release. They did, however, find that the group subject to 
outpatient commitment fared better than the control group on these 
measures if they remained under an outpatient commitment order for 
more than six months.182 
While the Duke researchers speculated that outpatient commitment 
might produce improved outcomes for participants who remain subject to 
a commitment order for an extended period of time, they conceded that the 
key variable, length of time under outpatient commitment, was not itself 
randomly assigned.183 Thus, as critics of the study have pointed out, if 
community providers disproportionately released patients who were more 
resistant to treatment or difficult to serve, then the pool of patients who 
were left in the study group after the initial six-month period of 
commitment would not provide a reliable basis for comparison with the 
control group.184 
179 See id.; Mark R. Munetz et al., The Effectiveness of Outpatient Civil Commitment, 47 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1251, 1251–52 (1996). See generally M. SUSAN RIDGELY ET AL., THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE 
EXPERIENCE OF EIGHT STATES (RAND CORP. 2001), available at http://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1340.pdf. 
180 See Marvin S. Swartz et al., Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Hospital 
Recidivism? Findings from a Randomized Trial in Severely Mentally Ill Individuals, 156 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1968 (1999). 
181 Id. at 1969; Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 27. 
182 See Swartz et al., supra note 180, at 1971. 
183 See id. 
184 Swartz and Swanson believe the critics’ speculation is unlikely. They report that 
“[h]igher-risk subjects appeared in preliminary analyses to have received longer periods of 
commitment,” which would make the study’s findings of the effectiveness of extended 
outpatient commitment even more robust, but they concede that “unknown selection factors 
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A second controlled study from the mid-1990s, conducted by Henry 
Steadman and his colleagues in New York, followed two randomly 
assigned groups of patients for one year following their release from 
Bellevue Hospital in New York City.185 All of the study subjects had 
histories of chronic severe mental illness. One group was subject to 
outpatient commitment orders and received intensive case management, 
community treatment, and other enhanced services. The other group 
received the same package of case management, treatment, and enhanced 
services but was not subject to an outpatient commitment order.186 The 
researchers found no statistically significant difference between the groups 
in terms of re-hospitalization, arrests, homelessness, or other quality of life 
measures, although both groups experienced improvements on most of 
these measures compared with their own functioning in the year prior to 
their admission to Bellevue.187 The researchers interpreted these data to 
suggest that intensive case management and the enhanced treatment and 
other services likely produced the improved outcomes, but that the 
variable of a court mandate had no additional positive effect on 
participants.188 Critics of this study have argued that the outpatient 
commitment orders were not enforced systematically and providers “did 
not clearly distinguish between the control and experimental groups.”189 
They have also argued that the study size probably was too small to 
produce the positive effects they believe outpatient commitment is capable 
of generating.190 
More recently, researchers in Great Britain conducted a randomized 
controlled study seeking to measure the effects of mandatory outpatient 
treatment on patients discharged from inpatient care.191 The Oxford 
Community Treatment Order Evaluation Trial (OCTET), published in the 
British journal, The Lancet, in 2013, sought to evaluate outcomes when 
patients with severe mental illness released from inpatient treatment 
“receive equivalent levels of clinical contact” in community-based 
could have affected OPC [outpatient commitment] duration.” Swartz & Swanson, supra note 
5, at 27. 
185 See Henry J. Steadman et al., Assessing the New York City Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment Pilot Program, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 330, 330 (2001). 
186 See id; see also Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 27–28. 
187 See Steadman et al., supra note 185, at 332–35; see also Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 
27–28. 
188 See Steadman et al., supra note 185, at 332–35; see also Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 
27–28. 
189 Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 28. 
190 Id. 
191 Tom Burns et al., Community Treatment Orders for Patients with Psychosis (OCTET): A 
Randomised Controlled Trial, 381 THE LANCET 1627, 1628 (2013). 
 
BOLDT_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/2015  10:11 AM 
74 New England  Law Review  v. 49 | 39  
treatment, “but different lengths of compulsory supervision.”192 The 
subjects of the study were all diagnosed with psychosis, deemed capable of 
providing informed consent, and “considered suitable for supervised 
outpatient care by their clinical teams.”193 Eligible subjects were assigned to 
two randomized groups, one subject to “Community Treatment Orders” 
(CTOs) and the other discharged from the hospital pursuant to so-called 
“Section 17” leaves of absence, a longstanding practice in which released 
patients remain subject to an inpatient commitment order for “brief periods 
to assess the stability of a patient’s recovery after or during a period of 
involuntary hospital treatment.”194 CTOs, in turn, are a relatively new 
alternative disposition, having been introduced in England and Wales in 
late 2008. The introduction of CTOs generated considerable controversy 
and produced intense resistance from a number of professional and patient 
advocacy organizations.195 They “require patients to accept clinical 
monitoring and allow rapid recall for assessment,”196 and “last for 6 
months, renewable for an additional 6 months, and subsequently for 1-year 
terms.”197 Given the differences between these two practices (CTOs versus 
Section 17 releases), it was no surprise that the OCTET researchers found 
“the total number of days under compulsion during follow-up was 
significantly greater in the CTO group . . . than in the Section 17 group . . . 
.”198 
The researchers followed the study subjects for twelve months, 
measuring rates of hospital readmission, time to first readmission, overall 
time in the hospital, and clinical and social functioning. They found no 
differences in primary (rate of hospital readmission), secondary (length to 
subsequent hospitalization, days in hospital, etc.), clinical, or social 
outcomes between the groups.199 They concluded that “[t]he evidence is 
now strong that the use of CTOs does not confer early patient benefits 
despite substantial curtailment of individual freedoms,” and urged that 
“any proposal to either introduce CTOs to new jurisdictions or extend their 
use would require a commitment to test their effects at least as rigorously 
as we have done.”200 
192 Id. at 1628. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 1628–29. 
195 See id. at 1627. 
196 Id. 
197 Burns et al., supra note 191, at 1629. 
198 See id. at 1631. 
199 See id. 
200 Id. at 1632. 
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While some have suggested that the OCTET study raises questions 
about the efficacy of outpatient commitment practices in the United States, 
critics of the study argue that it is not entirely relevant to the U.S. context 
because CTOs do not involve a judicial order and thus do not leverage the 
power of “the black robe.”201 Additionally, they argue that the study 
included some patients with little or no history of treatment non-
compliance, the group targeted by U.S. outpatient commitment advocates, 
and excluded a large number of patients who refused to consent to the 
research, a group presumably over-represented by individuals hostile to 
voluntary treatment.202 Finally, critics contend that neither the CTO group 
nor the Section 17 group spent enough time under mandate (in the case of 
the CTO group the average length was 170 days) to trigger the greater-
than-six-months benefits identified in the Duke study.203 
Notwithstanding these criticisms of the OCTET study, the results do 
raise serious questions about the relative contributions of coercion versus 
enhanced treatment and other services in producing favorable outcomes 
for treatment-resistant mentally ill patients subject to outpatient 
commitment. Some opponents of outpatient commitment contend that 
other community-based models, such as Assertive Community Treatment 
(ACT), which provide coordinated case management, enhanced treatment, 
and other aggressively delivered services, can be equally effective in 
reducing hospitalizations, homelessness, and criminal system 
involvement.204 A number of studies, including several meta-analyses, 
report that ACT can be effective in reducing the length and frequency of 
hospitalization and increasing independent living, while moderately 
improving psychiatric symptoms and quality of life for persons with severe 
mental illness.205 While ACT is more costly to administer than other models 
201 See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, supra note 170.   
202 See id. 
203 See id. 
204 Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) is defined as an evidence-based model that 
provides outpatient treatment, rehabilitation and support services to individuals who are 
diagnosed with severe mental illness and whose needs have not been well met by more 
traditional mental health service delivery models. Generally, ACT is used to provide services 
that are specifically tailored to the individual needs of the patients. It is distinguished from 
traditional approaches by the following features: a multidisciplinary team; low client/staff 
caseloads that enable more intensive contact; community-based services that are directly 
provided rather than brokered to other organizations; and 24-hour coverage by the treatment 
team. See About ACT, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, http://bi.omh.ny.gov/act/index 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2015).   
205 In one report covering more than twenty-five randomized controlled ACT trials, three-
quarters found that ACT was:  
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of outpatient treatment, several studies have found that it is more cost-
effective because of a reduced utilization of hospitalization and emergency 
services.206 
By far, the most intensive research on outpatient commitment in the 
United States has been conducted in New York in association with the 
reauthorization of Kendra’s Law. The 2005 reauthorization of the program 
“required an independent evaluation of its implementation and 
effectiveness,” which led the New York State Office of Mental Health to 
contract with researchers from Duke Medical School, the MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network on Mandated Community Treatment, and 
others to undertake a comprehensive study.207 The researchers reviewed a 
massive array of administrative data (hospital records, case manager 
reports, Medicaid claims, arrest records, and so forth) and conducted 
interviews with “key stakeholders” and “service recipients.”208 They 
reported a number of findings relating to regional variation, service 
engagement, recipient perceptions, and impact on the State’s overall public 
mental health system, but the findings with respect to outcomes are of 
central importance to the ongoing debate about the efficacy of mandated 
outpatient treatment, especially given that New York has provided more 
new treatment and service resources and set out a “more comprehensive 
implementation, infrastructure and oversight system” than is to be found 
in any other state with a program of outpatient commitment.209 
Significantly, and consistent with the earlier Duke study, the program 
more effective than usual care in reducing hospitalization and increasing 
client satisfaction with services. Effectiveness in other outcome domains 
[was] less consistent, however, 8 out of 12 studies found improvement in 
housing stability among those treated in ACT and 7 out of 12 showed 
improvements in subjective quality of life. 
See Center for Behavioral Health Services & Criminal Justice Research, Assertive Community 
Treatment: Intervention Fact Sheet, PLACER COUNTY NETWORK OF CARE, 
http://placer.networkofcare.org/mh/library/article.aspx?id=2436 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014). 
206 See, e.g., Craig M. Coldwell & William S. Bender, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSERTIVE 
COMMUNITY TREATMENT FOR HOMELESS POPULATIONS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS: A META-
ANALYSIS, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393, 398 (2007) (use of assertive community treatment “leads 
to greater improvement in housing stability and symptom reduction early in treatment. While 
hospitalization appears similar in assertive community treatment and standard case 
management, differences in hospitalization rate and duration require further study. These 
findings provide support for policy makers and community program directors to institute 
assertive community treatment as a best available practice to improve outcomes for the 
homeless mentally ill.”). 
207 See Swartz et al., supra note 114, at v. 
208 See id. at v–vi.  
209 See id. 
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evaluation found that service engagement was “comparable” for patients 
subject to Kendra’s Law and patients receiving outpatient treatment on a 
voluntary basis for the first six months, but that after twelve months the 
patients subject to Kendra’s Law were more engaged than were voluntary 
patients.210 The researchers also found “consistent evidence” that 
outpatient commitment under Kendra’s Law produced a “substantial 
reduction” in the number of psychiatric hospitalizations and in days spent 
in the hospital, as well as “moderately strong evidence” that it reduced the 
likelihood of being arrested.211 They reported that recipients of mandated 
care were “far more likely to consistently receive psychotropic medications 
appropriate to their psychiatric conditions,” and that case managers noted 
“subjective improvements in many areas of personal functioning, such as 
managing appointments, medications, and self-care tasks.”212 
In a special section of the journal Psychiatric Services published in 2010, 
many of these findings were elaborated in a series of detailed articles on 
the functioning of Kendra’s Law. In one of these articles, Marvin Swartz 
and his colleagues describe their analysis of Medicaid claims and other 
state records indicating that patients subject to outpatient commitment 
under Kendra’s Law experienced “reduced hospitalization and length of 
stay, increased receipt of psychotropic medication and intensive case 
management services, and greater engagement in outpatient services.”213 In 
another piece, Richard Van Dorn and his colleagues report findings 
consistent with the earlier North Carolina study that the “[b]enefits of 
involuntary outpatient commitment, as indicated by improved rates of 
medication possession and decreased hospitalizations, were more likely to 
persist after involuntary outpatient commitment ends if it is kept in place 
longer than six months.”214 And a third article by Allison Gilbert and 
colleagues, which compared arrest rates of patients under Kendra’s Law 
and those receiving voluntary community treatment, found a relative 
reduction in the odds of being arrested among those subject to outpatient 
commitment.215 
210 See id. at vii. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Marvin S. Swartz et al., Assessing Outcomes for Consumers in New York’s Assisted 
Outpatient Treatment Program, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 976, 976 (2010) (discussing Gilbert 
article). 
214 Richard A. Van Dorn et al., Continuing Medication and Hospitalization Outcomes After 
Assisted Outpatient Treatment in New York, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 982, 983 (2010). 
215 Marvin S. Swartz, Introduction to the Special Section on Assisted Outpatient Treatment in 
New York State, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 967, 968 (2010). 
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A largely consistent set of outcomes was reported by researchers from 
Columbia University and the New York State Psychiatric Institute who 
were funded by the New York State Office of Mental Health to conduct a 
“quasi-experimental” longitudinal study comparing seventy-six patients 
mandated to outpatient treatment in Queens and the Bronx and 108 
patients with similar characteristics who were not assigned to outpatient 
commitment.216 The researchers found little difference between the two 
groups in the extent to which they experienced psychotic symptoms, but 
the group subject to outpatient commitment was “less likely to perpetrate 
serious violent behavior (p<.05), had a lower risk of suicide (p<.05), and 
had better illness-related social functioning (p<.05).”217 Ultimately, the 
researchers concluded that “people’s lives seemed to be modestly 
improved along several dimensions by outpatient commitment as enacted 
in New York State under Kendra’s Law.”218 
The finding of reduced serious violent behavior is especially 
significant, given the larger debate in Congress and elsewhere concerning 
the need to prevent violence and reduce the number of seriously mentally 
ill persons who become enmeshed in the criminal system.219 The controlled 
studies of outpatient commitment in North Carolina and New York 
“yielded contradictory findings” on this score,220 and other research on the 
question has also produced inconsistent results. The Duke study found that 
“assignment to the outpatient commitment group did not reduce violence, 
[but] a combination of extended outpatient commitment and frequent 
service use was associated with less violence.”221 Other researchers have 
found no association between outpatient commitment and violence,222 but 
such a link was central to another study using longitudinal data of 262 
patients placed on outpatient commitment in the Piedmont region of North 
Carolina.223 
The Piedmont region study uncovered an association between 
extended mandatory community treatment and reduced rates of arrest for 
individuals with a history of “dual-system recidivism, that is, a history of 
both arrest and hospitalization,” and concluded that this association was 
216 See Phelan et al., supra note 59. 
217 Id. at 140–41. 
218 Id. at 142. 
219 See supra text accompanying notes 6–13. 
220 Swartz & Swanson, supra note 5, at 28. 
221 See Phelan et al., supra note 59, at 142. 
222 See Virginia A. Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience with 
Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 215 (1987). 
223 See Swanson et al., supra note 81, at 156. 
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mediated by the variable of violent behavior.224 Building on the findings of 
the earlier Duke study, these researchers hypothesized that, while 
outpatient commitment might not reduce the risk of arrest for all persons 
with serious mental illness, it could be effective for those with dual-system 
recidivism whose criminal system involvement would more likely be 
related to their mental illness.225 They focused on three variables, violent 
behavior, substance misuse, and medication compliance, “as likely 
intervening factors that might explain the effect of [outpatient 
commitment] in reducing arrest in prior dual-system recidivists.”226 The 
researchers found that extending outpatient commitment reduced violent 
behavior, and this was primarily responsible for the lower rates of arrest 
they observed in this population.227 Although the study was not a 
controlled randomized design, and the authors conceded that the 
relationships between outpatient commitment, violent behavior, and rates 
of arrest are complex and uncertain, they concluded that their data did 
suggest the potential for effective collaborations between criminal justice 
and mental health agencies and for the potential benefits of outpatient 
commitment when “judiciously applied.”228 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed Murphy Bill and calls by others for the increased use of 
outpatient commitment implicate a broader debate about the foundations 
of civil commitment law and practice. For advocates who assert that the 
restrictive approach to involuntary treatment adopted throughout the 
United States in the 1970s undermined legitimate parens patriae objectives, 
imposed unnecessary costs on the families of chronic mentally ill 
individuals, and left too many treatment-resistant patients disconnected 
from the public mental health system, the adoption of a more effective 
system of outpatient commitment, along with other reforms designed to 
bring patients into care before they decompensate into dangerousness or 
grave disability, is long overdue.229 The adoption of these reforms, 
224 See id. at 160, 183–84. 
225 See id. at 183–84. 
226 Id. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 184–86. 
229 See generally E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE; HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE TO 
TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS (2008) (noting the 
deinstitutionalization movement “emptied the nation’s psychiatric hospitals without ensuring 
that patients would receive care once they left the hospitals”).  
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however, raises difficult questions of funding, implementation, and 
enforcement.230 
In addition, there are legitimate questions about the benefits of 
mandated outpatient treatment relative to the costs that the use of 
government coercion may impose in terms of diminished patient 
autonomy and in chilling the willingness of mentally ill persons to seek 
treatment voluntarily.231 The most promising outcome studies, providing 
the strongest evidence of the upside potential of outpatient commitment, 
are from New York, the state that has most aggressively addressed the 
funding and implementation issues.232 Significant uncertainty remains, 
however, regarding the potential for enforced community-based treatment 
to reduce subsequent hospitalizations, arrests, homelessness, and distress 
in jurisdictions that do not put into place either adequate treatment and 
service resources or the administrative structures needed to ensure success. 
Moreover, even in New York the great majority of patients subject to 
Kendra’s Law have come under court order as a step-down measure upon 
their discharge from inpatient care.233 Presumably, the costs to individual 
self-determination and autonomy inherent in enforced treatment are lower 
for these patients, given that they are transitioning from inpatient 
confinement, than for the smaller number of individuals subject to 
outpatient commitment as a front-end measure. Challenging questions 
about the relative costs and benefits of mandated outpatient treatment 
remain, therefore, in other jurisdictions that may choose to deploy this 
intervention prospectively, especially if they offer fewer dedicated 
resources and less coordination of care than has been present in New York. 
Finally, the difficulty of enforcing outpatient commitment orders, 
given states’ reluctance to hold noncompliant patients in contempt or to 
impose other punitive measures, suggests that the practice must rest 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 112–76. 
231 See Richard J. Bonnie et al., supra note 49, at 801–02. 
[T]he coercion-centered reforms might deepen stigmatization of people 
with mental illnesses and impede progress toward a voluntary, recovery-
oriented system of services.  The perceived link between violence and 
mental illness leads people to frame the policy choices in mental health 
law as trade-offs between individual liberty and privacy, on one side, and 
greater security, on the other.  However, although such a trade-off is 
sometimes posed in certain cases, a climate of coercion drives people 
away from services.  The right prescription is to draw people into services 
by protecting privacy, mainstreaming mental health treatment, and 
destigmatizing mental illness.  
Id. 
232 See Swartz et al., supra note 114, at 3–4.  
233 See id. at vi. 
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primarily on either the “black-robe effect”234 or on a recognition that the 
true object of the court’s mandate is the network of community service 
providers, case managers, and others who presumably offer more focused 
and coordinated care as a consequence of the judicial involvement inherent 
in outpatient commitment. The former rationale is controversial at best and 
raises difficult questions of professional ethics and fairness.235 The latter 
rationale may well be the better ground for increasing the use of outpatient 
commitment, although an alternative effort on the part of state legislatures 
and public mental health policymakers to increase the use of Assertive 
Community Treatment without judicial involvement might well 
accomplish the same ends. Whether ACT and other policy and funding 
innovations that carry fewer costs to individual liberty can provide an 
equivalent stimulus to providers and others to offer effective and 
coordinated care to this difficult population of patients is a question that 
warrants further experimentation and study.236 The willingness of 
individual states or communities to undertake these alternative projects in 
lieu of an increasing use of outpatient commitment is likely to turn on the 
broader perspectives concerning civil commitment law and practice, 
already evident in the national debate over the Murphy Bill, which 
decision-makers bring to these deliberations.237 It is only with conscious 
attention to these background assumptions that an effective evaluation of 
relative costs and benefits can be accomplished. 
 
234 See TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, supra note 170. 
235 See Hoge & Grottole, supra note 171, at 167. 
236 See Coldwell & Bender, supra note 206, at 398. 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 99–112. 
 
